

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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P R 051110 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9700

INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL JEC PARIS

S E C R E T SAIGON 5720

EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR VS

SUBJECT: HUNGARIAN ICCS ATTITUDES

REF: A) STATE 59898; B) STATE 59897

1. SUMMARY: ICCS HUNGDEL REPS, INCLUDING MILITARY CHIEF MG SZUCS, USED OCCASION OF APRIL 3 HUNGARIAN RECEPTION TO REGISTER VIEWS RE MARCH 30 DEPT PROTECT TO HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR. SZUCS STRESSED LACK OF HUNGDEL INFLUENCE ON VN COMMUNISTS DESPITE BUDAPEST AND MOSCOW EFFORTS, AND " PERSONALLY BELIEVED" PEKING WAS IN " BEST POSTION" TO PRESSURE HANOI. OTHER CONVERSTATIONS REVEALED HUNGDEL CONVICTION THAT EMBASSY ICCS LIAISON UNIT RESPONSIBLE FOR DEMARCHE BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH (REFTELS) WHICH HAS OBVIOUSLY MADE STRONG IMPRESSION . HUNGDEL AT X PLUS 65 APPEARS TO FEEL ITSELF IN UNTENABLE SITUATION WITH NO CONTROL OVER VN CONTESTANTS AND UNABLE TO MEET US EXPECTATIONS FOR AGGRESSIVE AND IMPARTIAL ICCS ACTION. END SUMMARY

2. DURING APRIL 3 HUNGARIAN LIBERATION DAY RECEPTION, SEVERAL POLDEL/ HUNGDEL MEMBERS, INCLUDING HUNGDEL MILITARY CHIEF MAJ. GEN. SZUCS, TOOK ASIDE SEPARATELY TWO ICCS LIAISON EMBOFFS. APPROACHES WAERE CLEARLY PROGRAMMED TO MAKE INDIRECT REPLY TO LATEST EXCHANGE IN WASHINGTON OVER POLISH/ HUNGARIAN OBSTRUCTIONISM (REFTELS).

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REMARKS OF DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH IN HIS MARCH 30 CONVERSTATIONS WITH POLISH CHARGE AND HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR HAVE OBVIOUSLY MADE

STRONG IMPACT AND POLDEL/ HUNGDEL FIND THEMSELVES STRADDLING TWO HORSES WITH BURRS UNDER SADDLES OF BOTH.

3. GEN SZUCS ENGAGED EMBOFF IN LONG DISCUSSION, RESUMED TWICE AT HIS INITIATIVE AFTER INTERRUPTIONS, IN WHICH HE EXPLAINED LACK OF HUNGDEL INFLUENCE ON VN COMMUNIST SIDE. SZUCS STATED HUNGDEL HAD TRIED BY FAILED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TO EXERT SUCH INFLUENCE. WITHOUT ONE SUGGESTING THAT US APPLY GREATER PRESSURE ON GVN, SZUCS ANSWERED EMBOFF QUERY RE WHO COULD INFLUENCE HANOI WITH FIRM STATEMENT THAT PRC IS IN " BEST POSITION" IN THIS CASE. ASKED IF MOSCOW WAS NOT AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT, SZUCS SAID " PERSONALLY SPEAKING" HE BELIEVED PEKING MUST PRESSURE " THEM" (REFERRING TO HANOI RATHER THAN PRG), AS PEKING WAS CLOSEST AND MOSCOW TOO DISTANT TO BE EFFECTIVE. SZUCS CLAIMED MOSCOW " HAS TRIED SEVERAL TIMES" (TIME- FRAME OF HIS REFERENCE WAS UNCLEAR) BUT HAD HAD " LITTLE SUCCESS". EMBOFF SUGGESTED ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING US, GOH, GOP, USSR AND PRC, HAVE RESPONSIBILITY TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO CREATE PEACEFUL CONDITUONS SO THAT CUMULATIVE PRESSURE COULD NOT BE IGNORED BY NVN.

4. ON HEELS OF CONVERSATION WITH SZUCS, EMBOFF ENCOUNTERED GEZA RYBKA , HUNGDEL FIRST SECRETARY AND IDENTIFIED INTELL OFF, TOGETHER WITH POLDEL ADVISER KUSNIERZ, WHO JOINTLY QUESTIONED EMBOFF ON HIS INTERNAL EMBASSY CHAIN- OF- COMMAND, AND, WITH RYBKA LEADING THE ATTACK, CHARGED WITH CONVICTION THAT USG OBVIOUSLY LEPENDS ON EMBASSY ICCS LIAISON UNIT FOR ITS REPORTS ON ICCS ACTIVITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTIONS. EMBOFF EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR FLATTERING REMARKS, BUT OBSERVED USG HAS VARIETY OF SOURCES FOR SUCH REPORTS. LONG AND SOMETIMES CRITICAL EXCHANGES ON TONLE CHAM SITUATION ENSUED, WITH EMBOFF NOTING TONLE CHAM WAS DAILY EMASCULATING ICCS IMAGE, AND REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZING ICCS HAD SHOWN NO IMAGINATION OR INGENUITY IN ADDRESSING FIVE- WEEK OLD BATTLE WHICH HAD ALREADY COST BOTH SIDES SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES.

5. CHALLENGED FOR SUGGESTIONS, EMBOFF PROPOSED A WELL- PUBLICIZED- IN- ADVANCE VISIT BY ICCS TO TONLE CHAM, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, INTERVIEWI NG ARVN WOULDDED EVACUEES FORM TONLE CHAM WITH ACCOMPANYING OFFER TO PRG TO PROVIDE COMBATANTS FROM ITS SIDE IN BATTLE FOR THEIR SECRET

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STORIES, OR AN ICCS PHOTO- RECCE OF BATTLE SITE USING GVN AIRCRAFT CONTROLLED BY ICCS, ETC. AFTER HAVING EACH SUGGESTION REBUFFED, EMBOFF NOTED ICCS HAD NOT ENEN ASKED GVN IF, FOR ITS PART, IT WOULD ENSURE SECURITY OR AT LEAST PROMISE NOT TO FIRE DURIING ICCS VISIT TO SCENE. AFTER AGREEING NO SUCH REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE, HUNGDEL/ POLDEL REPS ONLY SHRUGGED AND SAID ICCS COULD DO NOTHING.

6. IN CONCLUSION, EMBOFF SAID THAT ALL KNEW VIOLATIONS HAD

OCCURRED ON BOTH SIDES SINCE JAN 28, BUT THAT AT TONLE CHAM NOT EVEN HUNGDEL/ POLDEL COULD PRETEND PRG/ DRV WAS BLAMELESS AS POST HAD BEEN IN GVN HANDS WITHOUT INTERRUPTION SINCE 1967. COMMUNIST TROOPS NOW WITHIN 100 METERS OF OUTPOST'S WIRE MADE IT OBVIOUS DRV/ PRG CERTAINLY WERE NOT THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES UNDER ATTACK. FURTHERMORE, WORLD WAS WELL AWARE OF THIS MAJOR VIOLATION AND ICCS WOULD BE AMONG MOST IMPORTANT LOSERS IF THIS

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, AND KUSNIERZ ALL EMPHASIZED TO EMBOFF THAT RECENT " THREATS" BY PRESIDENTS NIXON AND THIEU TO EMPLOY US AIRPOWER AGAIN IN VN " DO NOT HELP THE SITUATION," AND THAT SERIOUS TALKS WERE MORE IN ORDER.

8. WHILE THESE CONVERSATIONS WERE UNDERWAY HUNGDEL THIRD SECRETARY JANOS BARABAS SOUGHT OUT SECOND EMBOFF FOR LENGTHY DISCUSSION TO EXPLAIN WHY ICCS UNDER CURRENT CONDITIONS CANNOT MEET US EXPECTATIONS. BARABAS SAID IT WAS " IMPOSSIBLE" AT PRESENT TIME FOR ICCS TO UNANIMOUSLY APPROVE INVESTIGATION REPORT OF ANY ###

THE OTHER OF THE TWO SIDES. HE DID NOT DENY EMBOFF'S INTERPRETATION OF THESE REMARKS AS MEANING HUNGDEL UNABLE TO CONDEMN PRG/ DRV VIOLATIONS. INSTEAD HE ANSWERED THAT HUNGARIANS FULLY UNDERSTOOD US POSITION, BUT OTHER RELATIONSHIPS ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO BUDAPEST THAN US- HUNGARIAN BILATERALS. BARABAS ADDED PESSIMISTICALLY THAT THERE IS SIMPLY NO WAY FOR ICCS TO ACT NOW IN AN IMPARTIAL AND AGGRESSIVE MANNER EXCEPT ON THE MOST MINOR IF INCIDENTS.

9. THIS SITUATION IS ONLY EXACERBATED, ACCORDING TO BARABAS, BY CANDEL'S HEAVY- HANDED ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE ICCS AND MAKE IT AN SECRET

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INSTRUMENT OF CANDEL'S OWN CHOOSING. HUNGDEL WILL NOT ALLOW THE ICCS TO BE USED AS A DEVICE TO FAVOR ONE SIDE. IF THIS MEAND ICCS INACTION, THEN, BARABAS SAID, THAT IS THE REALITY OF THE SITUATION WHICH IS ONLY FURTHER WORSENER BY CANDEL'S LATEST ACTIONS IN ATTACHING " PRE- CONDITIONS" TO ITS CONTINUED PARTICIPATION. CANDEL, IN HIS OPINION, IS NOT LONGER ONE PARTY TO THE ICCS; IT IS NOW ONLY " HALF- A- PARTY".

COMMENT: AGGRESSIVE " HITS" BY SZUCS, RYBKA AND BARABAS, SUPPLEMENTED BY KUSNIERZ, LEAVE LITTLE DOUBT HUNGDEL/ POLDEL WERE BURNED BY MARCH 30 SUMMONING OF THEIR AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON. RYBKA'S APPROACH WAS MOST OBVIOUSIN MAKING IT CLEAR THAT EMBOFF, TOGETHER WITH HIS COLLEAGUES IN EMBASSY LIAISON UNIT, HAD TO BE THE SOURCE OF CURRENT USG ASSESSMENT OF ICCS. POLDEL REPS APPEARED TO LET HUNGDEL CARRY THE BALL, AT LEAST AT THIS RECEPTION, BUT THEIR TIME IS OBVIOUSLY COMING. BOTH KUSNIERZ AND RYBKA REQUESTED OPPORTUNITIES TO MEET EMBOFFS LATER THIS WEEK FOR TALKS, THUS SIGNALLING DESIRE TO PURSUE DIALOGUE. MAJOR POINT

OF THE FOREGOING APPROACHES WAS THAT TWO COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS CANNOT MEET US EXPECTATIONS, AT LEAST UNDER EXISTING ORDER FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS. INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED (EXCEPTING HARD- LINE RYBKA) APPEARED TO APPRECIATE AT LEAST A DEGREE OF LEGITIMACY IN US POSITION, AND- LIKE SOME OF THEIR COLLEAGUES CONGEN OFFICERS HAVE REPORTED ON FROM THE PROVINCES- FLET SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED AND INCOMFORTABLE WITH POSITIONS THEY ARE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN IN FACE OF FACTS.

WHITEHOUSE

NOTE BY OCT: ### OMISSIONS;
CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 07 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 APR 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973SAIGON05720
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: SAIGON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730460/abqcehpe.tel
Line Count: 177
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: A) STATE 59898; B) STATE 59897
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15-Aug-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <06-Nov-2001 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 971201
Subject: HUNGARIAN ICCS ATTITUDES
TAGS: MARR, VS
To: STATE INFO BUDAPEST
JAKARTA
OTTAWA
WARSAW
JEC PARIS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

